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Currently, virtual world governance is the product of end user license agreements (EULAs), 
contracts which attempt to provide a complete legal and enforcement system to the virtual world.  
This method of governance is flawed, however, and results in participant frustration.  Alternative 
approaches that have been advanced so far include governmental regulation, which has begun in 
some countries.  However, numerous pressures and precedent resist such an application in the 
United States. 
The following argues against keeping just the license agreements as the body of law, and also 
against a shift to governmental regulation.  Instead, a compromise—establishing a standards-setting 
body of developers, referred to here as a virtual world council—is an efficient solution.  This is a 
daunting task; however, numerous examples exist for the developers of virtual worlds to follow and 
they are explained below.  The proposed result is a two-tier system that retains EULAs, and supports 
a common law approach rooted in standardization for resolving what EULAs cannot. 
 
Introduction 
 
Virtual worlds are “the next generation of the internet: three-dimensional social environments that combine top-of-
the-line videogame graphics with latest-generation social-networking technology.”2  They are interactive, 
persistent simulations of first-person physical environments.3  Millions of people participate in these virtual worlds 
for diverse reasons: for example, escapism, profiteering, or for a sense of belonging to a community.  Developers 
create virtual worlds and make them immersive and debatably addictive.4  The developers charge fees for property 
within virtual worlds, or for access to the virtual world, and use these revenues to recover their development and 
operating expenditures.  They also attempt to regulate these virtual worlds, with varying success.  Here, I examine 
those attempts (with indebtedness to prior works) and then suggest a new method which is a compromise between 
the current methods of regulation. 
Prior works on the regulation of virtual worlds have identified major defects with the two current methods 
of regulating virtual worlds.  The primary method is the developer’s End User License Agreement (EULA)—a 
contract between the developer and the participant that communicates the developer’s expectations for the virtual 
world to the participant, and the participant’s agreement communicates their intent to be bound by those 
expectations.5  This EULA usually gives the developer the power to adjudicate and punish participant behavior 
that is outside of those expectations, and power to set expectations.  A real-world analogy is the developer 
controlling the legislative and judicial branches of government, and running the government as a for-profit 
enterprise.  These EULAs set the laws of the land for the virtual world, trying to incorporate a bare minimum of 
real-world legal principles to keep their participants complacent. 
Real-world citizenship is often a matter of where you were born.  By contrast, “[p]eople joining virtual 
worlds have the power of choice. . . . they can choose the society in which they want to live, migrating their online 
activities from place to place with much greater ease than real-world immigrants can move their physical lives.”6  
                                                          
1
 An electronic version of this and other articles are available at http://www.brendanjamesgilbert.com and I am available at 
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As a result, “[v]irtual world providers who operate within this market-dynamic measure their success in terms of 
the size of their user base, and they consequently pursue two goals: attracting people to join their virtual world, 
and retaining them over time.”7  Because virtual-world citizens can pick their government and regulation, 
developers must make them appealing. 
The other method of regulating virtual worlds has not yet been used in the United States, but is waiting in 
the wings: real-world governmental regulation.  Virtual-world developers and participants regard this method with 
horror, recalling the file-sharing service Napster.  Regulation fractured Napster’s centralized peer-to-peer 
community into decentralized peer-to-peer communities that are too small to feasibly regulate.8 
Real-world regulators want to avoid this outcome.  Questions abound about the method of regulation.  
Should regulators regulate the virtual-world providers within the regulator’s jurisdiction, or to coordinate inter-
jurisdictionally?9  Should regulators limit participants’ ability to switch worlds, or limit participants to virtual-
world developers within their real-world jurisdiction?10  No clear answer exists for these, and persuading 
jurisdictions to agree and cooperate is difficult. 
A compromise suggested is for developers of virtual worlds to form a virtual-world council.  This council 
can promote standardization of EULAs between developers.  Standardization will provide consistent virtual-world 
governance and consistent provisions for courts to look to.  This council can also collectively draft model real-
world regulation and create standards-setting bodies for virtual worlds to guide real-world regulators.  Participants 
being participants, they will test the rules of their virtual world: they will find loopholes in the provisions of their 
developer’s EULA.  Real-world regulation “floating” above the EULA is needed to catch this.  It protects 
participants from behaviors not prohibited by the EULA but deserving of punishment. 
This compromise is efficient because developers are best equipped to find the shortcomings of their 
EULAs.  User feedback, litigation, and research while drafting EULAs accomplish this.  Additionally, each 
developer must draft a EULA and having the virtual world council help draft provisions is efficient.  Developers 
also wield the power and political muscle to lobby for real-world regulations to control behavior in virtual worlds, 
particularly if they form a group and present a unified front.  Standards will also lower the high precedential value 
of the first “lucky” jurisdiction to have virtual-world-based litigation go to trial. 
Organizing this council is a difficult task.  However, the credit card companies American Express, Discover 
Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa, Inc. launched a similar effort in 2006.  
Called the PCI Security Standards Council, the Council’s mission has been to develop a consistent “Data Security 
Standard” which has been implemented into each company’s data security compliance program.11  Retail 
merchants now know of a set of standards that apply to them if they are to be “PCI-compliant”—just as 
participants and courts considering a virtual world that is “virtual-world-council-compliant” will know what to 
expect from it. 
This consists of four Parts.  Part I introduces virtual worlds and their sources of regulation.  Part II 
examines the reasons why EULAs alone have failed or will fail as the only source of regulation.  Part III examines 
the reasons why external regulation alone will fail regardless of implementation, and how to prolong the life of 
any proposed regulation.  Part IV will show the benefits of consistency that a virtual-world council could provide 
to a two-tier system of regulation, and why it is the most efficient solution. 
 
1.  Virtual Worlds and the Sources of Virtual-World Regulation 
 
Modern virtual worlds’ heritage runs to textual virtual worlds, which are given a variety of names to denote their 
purpose.12  An example is LambdaMOO, which began a discussion on virtual world’s “parallel alternative to 
existing legal systems, where new forms of social regulation can be explored.”13  On LambdaMOO, “public and 
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 Id. at 1824 (“If real-world regulators push too hard, one potential outcome could be that we may witness ‘Napster's Second 
Life,’ the transformation of virtual worlds onto a highly decentralized P2P infrastructure that is hosted on individual users' 
computers.”); Phillip Stoup, Note, The Development and Failure of Social Norms in Second Life, 58 DUKE L.J. 311, 340–41 
(2008) (“Similar to the fracturing that occurred after the government heavily regulated internet file-sharing programs like the 
popular program ‘Napster,’ real-world regulation could lead to the dissolution of Second Life.”). 
9
 Mayer-Schönberger et al., supra note 5 at 1821. 
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 PCI Security Standards Council, About the PCI Security Standards Council, 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about/index.shtml. 
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 For a discussion of the acronyms used and their meanings, see F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual 
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comm[unal] property was [virtual property’s] prototypical form of ownership.”14  The virtual world’s 
“[e]xperienced players also build their own rooms and spaces within the MOO, or, using an object-oriented 
programming language, create objects that they and other players can manipulate or expand.”15  These 
“[p]articipants in the MOO are literally building their own universe room by room.  At the same time, they are 
building their own social structure, as well as their own legal system.”16 
Eventually, real-world-property issues infected LambdaMOO: air-space rights over properties (for virtual 
aircraft), private versus public property, whether property could be bequeathed, and server-side-data quotas per 
participant.17  These required “making property an explicit part of the system and creating an official governance 
mechanism to recognize and allocate it.”  Property interests are tied to Western society such that asserting property 
rights is instinctual.  Therefore, virtual worlds have come to require regulation to support participants’ view that 
their virtual-world property is able to be protected just like their real-world property. 
Virtual property here is closer to real property or chattels than intellectual property.  A participant’s virtual 
property has their ownership right recorded somewhere in a database that the virtual world relies on.18  The 
participant then expects the use and control of the property to be one of their rights. 
On LambdaMOO and in many textual virtual worlds the communities are close-knit.  Developers knew the 
participants and were “benevolent dictators,” styling themselves as “wizards.”19  Three years after its creation, 
arch-wizard Pavel Curtis decided that his social experiment had grown up: “the wizards are pulling out of the 
discipline/manners/arbitration business; we're handing the burden and freedom of that role to the society at 
large.”20  These wizards made themselves the community’s code architects—their functions “might be analogized 
to a cross between an administrative agency and a higher court.”  Significant issues go to a public vote and 
volunteers staff a binding arbitration system.  The system is not without its flaws.21 
Unlike the virtual worlds that have since made the industry famous, LambdaMOO’s legal system has been 
shaped by the community, rather than the legal system made to shape the community.  Property issues were not 
contemplated and a EULA drafted prior to participation; they arose when participants clamored for them.  Curtis’s 
intent in getting out of the discipline business was to allow the community to self-govern.22  This effort ultimately 
failed; within two years Curtis “restored the rule of the wizard by fiat.”23 
Compare LambdaMOO’s system of regulation by the community to more recent virtual worlds’ systems of 
developer-designed regulation of the community.  Some virtual worlds support participant creation of rooms and 
objects within the virtual world, such as Second Life.24  Other worlds’ developers carefully create and balance their 
content and allow participants little to no autonomy in content creation.  They focus on allowing participants to 
virtually “acquire” developer-created property.25 
All of these recent virtual worlds have “millions of dollars of venture capital at stake,” moneys that are 
ventured to build cash flows for the developer to maximize investors’ contributions.26  From the developers’ 
perspective, governance by the community is not structured such that investor return is maximized, and is 
therefore inferior.  Their solution is top-down governance. 
                                                          
14
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 World of Warcraft End User License Agreement § 4 (A), available at http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html.  
(“All title, ownership rights and intellectual property rights in and to the Game . . . []including without limitation any . . . 
objects, characters, character names, stories, dialog, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, character inventories, structural 
or landscape designs, animations, sounds, . . . are owned or licensed by Blizzard.”) 
26
 Lastowka et al., supra note 11 at 59. 
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The results are “EULAs that attempt to dismantle even the potential of virtual rights.”27  These EULAs 
provide as few rights as possible, and also set up regulatory systems to enforce developer’s expectations for 
participant behavior.  LambdaMOO’s alternative might erode the developer’s rights in their virtual world, where 
they “should have a right to do exactly as they please,” as goes the argument.28  Therefore, EULAs usually present 
a system tilted toward the developer.  In the next Part, reasons why this scheme fails are examined. 
 
2. EULAs Fail to Provide Regulation to Both the Developer and User, Requiring 
External Regulation 
 
EULAs are contracts between virtual world’s developers and their customers.29  They provide what customers can 
and cannot do with the virtual world, and provide what rights customers have in their avatars and creations in the 
virtual world and the real world.30  EULAs are the primary source of virtual-world law and regulation.  When 
drafting a EULA, usually only the developer and the developer’s counsel are at the table.31  As a result, the 
developer arrogates all rights it could possibly want to it, often including the rights to any participant creations 
within the developer’s virtual world.32   
Participants first encounter the EULA after their coworkers, friends or family cajoles them into joining.  
They have, in most cases, already made their decision.  They have people relying on them to swing a sword for 
them or bandage them up.  They have a friend who has created a massive art gallery in Second Life or There and 
wants their feedback.  After installation and even account creation, participants encounter the EULA on a “take-it-
or-leave-it” basis.33  To get in requires acceptance of the EULA—a complicated legal document that looks like 
real estate boilerplate. 
The EULA tries to define participants’ behavior, which often includes forbidding communicating other 
user’s personal information.34  Developers have an interest in implementing provisions of the EULA as 
programmatic constraints—meaning virtual-world code-based—on the participants where possible.35  This lowers 
the developers’ use of resources to police the EULA. 
EULAs’ regulatory framework is fraught with problems. First, the developers’ superior bargaining strength 
results in a stilted EULA that is susceptible to the unconscionability doctrine.  Second, participants aggrieved by 
other participants within the virtual world often have recourse under the EULA only at the developers’ discretion, 
either due to the EULA’s terms or because of relying on the developer to provide personal information of the other 
participant.  Third, the developers’ intent is to keep subscribers happy, paying, and enlisting their friends as 
subscribers, not act as their virtual world’s judiciary.36  Fourth, participants who are determined to exploit the 
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Life | Terms of Service, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (“In addition to abiding at all times by the 
Community Standards, you agree that you shall not: . . . (v) take any actions or upload, post, e-mail or otherwise transmit 
Content that contains . . . personal information[.]”). 
35
 See Stoup, supra note 7 at 320 (“Code-based norms can be created and employed by [developers] to fulfill the virtual world's 
important objectives, but unlike non-code-based norms, these rules are enforced through the very computer code of [the virtual 
world].”  Using the code-based alternative “defin[es] what conduct or behaviors are possible in the computer program's virtual 
world,” for example, making a theft-proof purse to store items.) 
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 See Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands—Why You Should Monitor the Misuse of Your Intellectual 
Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 690 (2009) (“Linden Lab is aware that its approach 
may fail to satisfy many owners of intellectual property, but responds that it does ‘not intend to become the law enforcement of 
Second Life;’ ” Quarmby’s analysis also states that “[a]s a commercial entity . . . Linden Lab is understandably reluctant to 
take on the mantle of a police state. It simply reserves the right to terminate the accounts of individuals who appear to be 
infringing on others' intellectual property - a step that it will not take lightly.”). 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2009)  
242 
 
programmed rules of the virtual world, whether for personal gain or pleasure, do so without meaningful 
repercussions.37  The following section covers these four problems in-depth. 
 
2.1 EULAs and the Unconscionability Doctrine 
 
Modern findings of unconscionability arise under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, stating that 
courts “may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or clause, or may limit an unconscionable clause to 
avoid an unconscionable result.”38  Because the Code does not define unconscionability,39 courts have generally 
required that both procedural and substantive unconscionability exist.  The traditional wisdom is that courts fail to 
find unconscionability.40  By contrast, arbitration provisions, which are often employed in EULAs, have proven 
rather susceptible to holdings of unconscionability.41  Many of these holdings were in California or applying 
California law.42 
To a court, holding EULA provisions unconscionable should be a controversial decision.  Many 
commentators believe that unconscionability should be reserved for gross injustice and beyond the pale behavior.  
For example, consider a retail store who sells separate items of furniture over a number of years via installment 
lines of credit to a single parent raising a large family on public welfare.  If the store buried a provision in fine 
print that keeps a balance due on all items until each and every item is paid off in full, such that when the customer 
defaults the store can sue for every piece of furniture otherwise fully paid for and “sold,” that provision should be 
held unconscionable.43  Courts that apply this doctrine to participants who either did not read the EULA, or 
enjoyed the service provided by the EULA then breached its terms, may be viewed as activist.  Notwithstanding 
this risk, federal courts have found unconscionability in EULAs.44
 
The first part of the test, procedural unconscionability, looks at the agreement for unequal bargaining 
power.  EULAs usually meet this part.45  Participants have zero bargaining power in EULAs; they are designed to 
be contracts for millions of participants to accept, typically without reading.46  Contracts of adhesion tend to 
indicate procedural unconscionability.47  Generally, they come on pre-printed forms for the mass-market, giving 
the consumer no ability to negotiate.48  They also use general terms and reflect the developer’s interests.49  The 
participant’s actual surprise as to the harshness of provisions subsequent to agreement to the contract is also an 
element of procedural unconscionability within California.50 
The second part, substantive unconscionability, looks to the terms of the agreement, and is indicated by 
“harsh, one-sided or oppressive terms. . . .”51  EULAs usually meet this part as well.  Most of them give the 
developer “unilateral, unchecked, godlike power, while the customer has few or no rights.”52  Even virtual worlds 
that purport to protect participants’ intellectual property rights53 retain complete control over their currency, 
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 Stoup, supra note 7 at 339 (“there will likely always be individuals who have the inclination to ignore the clear rules and the 
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 Id. at 194. 
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 Jason T. Kunze, Comment, Regulating Virtual Worlds Optimally: The Model End User License Agreement, 7 NW. J. TECH. & 
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46
 Alfred Fritzsche V, Trespass to (Virtual) Chattels: Assessing Online Gamers’ Authority to Sell In-Game Assets Where 
Adhesive Contracts Prohibit Such Activity, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 235, available at http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article/666/. 
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 Id. at n.217; Bragg, supra note 32 at 605 (“A contract or clause is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of 
adhesion.”). 
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 Id. at nn.223–24; Bragg, supra note 32 at 606. 
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 Id.; Bragg, supra note 32 at 606. 
50
 Bragg, supra note 32 at 606 (quoting Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)); see infra 
note 55 for the importance of California caselaw in arbitration provisions of EULAs. 
51
 Randall, supra note 37 at 191. 
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 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 17. 
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 Linden Research claims that their Second Life virtual world protects customer’s intellectual property rights.  Quarmby, supra 
note 35 at 670 n.19 (citing Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov. 14, 2003)).  
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“analogous to a casino arbitrarily eliminating the market for its chips and keeping all of its customer's money.”54  
Furthermore, EULAs typically allow developers to change the agreement at any time without notice to the user, in 
addition to their “godlike power” already reserved.55 
Federal courts have held these agreements unconscionable.56  In Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down Second Life’s provision requiring arbitration.57  Bragg purchased a 
number of parcels of land in Linden’s virtual world Second Life, paying real money for the property right.58  
Linden deemed that one of these parcels for which Bragg paid $300 off of an auction site was purchased via an 
“exploit.”59  Based on that, Linden “froze Bragg’s account, effectively confiscating all of the virtual property and 
currency[.]”  Bragg sued Linden in Pennsylvania, and Linden moved for dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
The court found that Linden’s national campaign to induce investment met minimum contacts for specific personal 
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.60 
After settling that, the court moved to Linden’s motion to compel arbitration, based on a provision in the 
EULA.61  They found that the provision intended to take the participant by surprise, “buried . . . in a lengthy 
paragraph under the benign heading ‘GENERAL PROVISIONS.’ ”62  Because of the EULA also met the 
requirements of a contract of adhesion, this was held to meet procedural unconscionability.63 
Substantive unconscionability was met by a number of the EULA’s elements.64  These included a lack of 
mutuality in forcing the participant to arbitrate while the developer has a choice of forums, and the excessive cost 
incurred by the participant in arbitrating in San Francisco versus the cost in filing in court in Pennsylvania.65  Also 
considered were the venue restriction for arbitration in light of the small size of financial transactions most 
participants have with Second Life, and the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, which results in “a one-sided 
means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations, in Linden's favor.”66 
The Bragg court demonstrates that courts are willing to erode the terms of EULAs.  This creates a chilling 
effect for both developers and participants, each uncertain of the terms of their agreement.67  For example, Second 
Life’s EULA allows Linden Research to completely control Second Life’s currency up to and including removing 
it all.  Any measures taken by Linden Research to use that EULA provision, however, will send Second Life 
participants to federal courts in droves to recover their real money losses.68  The system to exchange real money 
for Second Life currency and vice versa operated by Linden Research69 underscores the substantive 
unconscionability of allowing Linden Research to use this provision. 
The question to developers and participants becomes: Which of these EULA provisions are enforceable in 
court, and which can I disregard?  If EULAs are not modified by developers to withstand these challenges, 
developers will have them modified by courts, inspired by the Bragg court, to protect participants. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
719–46 (according to Complaint, Linden Research failed to protect USPTO registered trademark within Second Life; a week 
after the Complaint was filed, Linden Research challenged the mark claiming it was fraudulently obtained). 
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 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 17. 
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56
 Several prominent virtual worlds are developed by corporations in California, including Linden Research, Inc.’s Second Life 
and Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft.  In addition, their EULAs often include forum selection clauses that compel 
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 Bragg, supra note 32 at 611. 
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 Id. at 596–97. 
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 Id. at 597. 
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 Id. at 601–02. 
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 Id. at 603. 
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 Id. at 606. 
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 Id.; the Bragg court also cites Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Cal. 2002) as “most instructive[,]” a class 
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 Bragg, supra note 32 at 607. 
65
 Id. at 607–11. 
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 Id. 
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 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 32 (“A chilling effect occurs when behavior might run afoul of the EULA, but the agreement may 
potentially be unenforceable, so parties err on the side of too much caution in order to avoid the potential risk that exists in the 
grey areas of the agreement.”). 
68
 Id. at ¶ 33. 
69
 This currency exchange is called the LindeX, described in detail at id. at ¶ 2 n.4; Second Life | Terms of Service, § 1.5, 
available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php. 
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2.2   Participants’ Recourse under EULAs 
 
In the real world, if your neighbor cutting down a tree in his yard with a chainsaw at 3 a.m. annoys you, your first 
means of recourse is through the police to stop them from cutting down trees at ungodly hours.  After that, you 
have civil courts for nuisance and restraining orders, letters to the Arbor Day Foundation, and a whole host of 
extra-legal recourses.  In virtual worlds, if a participant is aggrieved by a neighbor building garish signs with 
political messages adjacent to their property70 their first means of recourse is through the EULA’s provisions. 
Usually, this means “opening up a ticket” or filing an abuse report that is queued for service from an 
employee of the developer.71  The employee interprets the EULA, exercising the developer’s rights appropriately.  
For example, the employee may warn or suspend the account of a harasser.  Or, the employee may remove or alter 
materials that should not exist in the virtual world.72  All of these occur at the employee’s or developer’s 
discretion.  A real-world analogy would be the employee representing the police, judge, jury, and jailor. 
 The maximum punishment meted out in many virtual worlds is account termination.73  Developers 
typically do not report any activity within their virtual world to authorities even if it is likely in violation of civil or 
penal laws, unless subpoenaed.74  Developers often do not facilitate participants’ attempts to sue other participants 
by providing IP addresses75 or personal information of the other participant.  Even if a participant would be 
entitled under real-world law to a greater remedy than the EULA and developer allow, the EULA and the 
developer’s privacy policy usually protect personal information from disclosure.76 
This generally makes participants’ attempts to pursue remedies outside of the developer’s EULA futile.  To 
do so, the participant would have to know their intended defendant’s name and address.77  Under many privacy 
policies, the participant must also convince the developer to release this personal information.78  The developer 
also may not be able to provide useful information about a participant for outside remedies.  For example, Second 
Life now requires just an email address to register.79 
Participants often rightly blame the EULA and the developer’s policies for making them unable to fight for 
a remedy.  It drives some participants to extremes.  For example, an acquaintance of Qiu Chengwei stole and sold 
Chengwei’s rare sword from a Chinese virtual world.80  Chengwei went to the police, who believed the 
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 Stoup, supra note 7 at 331 (“For example, a Second Life resident named Lazarus Devine angered many other users by 
erecting garish virtual signs calling for an end to the war in Iraq and to “Impeach Bush” on property he purchased adjacent to 
the disgruntled users. . . . Despite the best efforts of the disgruntled users, Lazarus Devine continued his campaign to erect 
garish signs.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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 McCarthy, supra note 52, contains an example of this process: “I filed an abuse report immediately, a procedure you follow 
in [Second Life] when there is an issue with another resident.”  The report “automatically notes the precise location of your 
avatar when the report is filed, and it included a snapshot of the scene I saw there, with the infringing[] sign. I received e-mail 
confirmation of the abuse report.” 
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 Id. 
73
 See Stoup, supra note 7 at 331 (“Even Second Life's harshest sanction, the threat of account termination, which is prescribed 
as a possible punishment in the virtual world's Term [sic] of Service, is also likely an ineffective sanction.”); see also Quarmby, 
supra note 35 at 690. 
74
 See Leonard T. Nuara et al., No Man is an Island, not even in a Virtual World, 943 PLI/Pat 523, 557 n.159 (2008) (“In 
compliance with a subpoena . . . Linden Lab and PayPal provided Catteneo's IP address to Alderman.”).  Commentators 
advocate that certain activities, in particular illicit and pornographic ones, should receive real-world reporting to authorities 
from developers.  See Stoup, supra note 7 at 337. 
75
 An IP address is a unique identifier for a computer that is accessible through the internet. 
76
 E.g. Linden Lab, Second Life | Terms of Service, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php.  (“Linden Lab will not 
give any of your personal information to any third party without your express approval except: . . . to law enforcement or other 
appropriate third parties in connection with criminal investigations and other investigations of fraud[.]”), see also Linden Lab, 
Second Life | Privacy Policy, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php.  (“Linden Lab may disclose your 
personal information if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such action is necessary to: . . . (b) protect and 
defend the rights or property of . . . the users of Second Life[.]”) (emphases added) 
77
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (a)(1)(B) (requiring summons to be “directed to the defendant”) and FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (e)(2)(B) (leaving 
summons at “dwelling or usual place of abode”). 
78
 Linden Lab, supra note 75. 
79
 Quarmby, supra note 35 at 692. (“Formerly, Linden Lab required prospective users to provide a valid credit card or Paypal 
account, or to respond to a cell phone SMS text message, in order to open an account.  After June 6, 2006, however, its users 
may create an account with only an e-mail address.”  Quarmby goes on to indicate Linden’s other sources of user information: 
“[Linden] should, however, still be in a position to provide that user's IP address.  But even that is not always guaranteed.  
[Software programs] allow users' computers to generate a new IP address every time they go online, thus thwarting attempts to 
easily track down an infringer by IP address alone.”) (internal citations omitted). 
80
 Jacob Rogers, Note, A Passive Approach to Regulation of Virtual Worlds, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 409 (2008); 
Westbrook, supra note 17 at 789. 
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acquaintance broke no laws because the sword was virtual property and therefore not protectable.81  Therefore, he 
took matters into his own hands a month later—he stabbed the acquaintance to death.82  At trial he confessed and 
received life imprisonment.83 
For every participant who lashes out like Chengwei due to their lack of a sufficient remedy, countless more 
simply become dissatisfied with the virtual world and its developers.  These participants stop paying and leave the 
virtual world.84  What ties them to the world are all of their virtual possessions, which are generally not 
transferable and not able to be sold, and their reputation within the virtual world.85  These create lock-in and 
network effects.86  Because of the emigration from EULAs that fail to provide remedies, and the bad press from 
occurrences like Changwei’s, the ineffective remedies provided to participants by EULAs should be of concern to 
developers. 
A counterargument is that these virtual worlds are merely games and incidents like Changwei’s are caused 
by unstable humans, not their participation in a game.  Unlike traditional games, virtual worlds cross massive 
distances.  If this kind of activity occurred in the real world and nearby, participants could pursue less severe 
options.  Having no options pushes them to extremes.  Given the real world ability to pursue vengeance, they do 
so.  
The United States lags behind other countries in this lack of real-world recourse for virtual-world 
participants.  In South Korea virtual worlds have much greater traction due to the success of NCsoft’s Lineage, 
released in 1998.87  South Korea protects virtual property, which “cannot be bought or sold commercially, but it 
can be exchanged between non-merchant individuals for in-world trade or currency.  Theft of virtual property is a 
criminal offense.”88  Additionally, Dutch and Japanese courts have convicted for theft of virtual property.89  Other 
foreign jurisdictions have begun to map real-world rights and regulation into virtual worlds,90 and as a result 
become more or less attractive to business investment.91 
 
2.3 Developer’s Intent with EULAs 
 
Developers countervail their self-imposed duties92 to punish and correct with their desire to retain paying 
participants.93  They aren’t creating virtual worlds for the sake of creating virtual worlds and social 
experimentation, as LambdaMOO did.94  Instead, they have returns to maximize for investors and shareholders.95  
Because of this, there is an interest in creating as oppressive a regulatory regime as possible.  Doing so lowers 
administrative and litigation expenses,96 so long as it doesn’t scare away potential subscribers or drive out existing 
                                                          
81
 Sean F. Kane, Virtually Lawless: Legal and Economic Issues in Virtual Worlds, 929 PLI/Pat 553, 565 (2008).  China is 
notable for now protecting virtual property—if Changwei had contacted the police after those protections were enacted, his 
story may have ended differently.  See Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1085. 
82
 Rogers, supra note 79 at 789. 
83
 Id. 
84
 David Assalone, Comment, Law in the Virtual World: Should the Surreal World of Online Communities be Brought Back to 
Earth by Real World Laws?, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 163, 195 (2009) (“With no means to appeal a Linden Lab decision 
within the TOS, a dissatisfied user who wants to dispute only has one method to voice their discontent: leaving the game 
platform.”). 
85
 See infra Part II.C (discussing real money trading). 
86
 See Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 6; Mayer-Schönberger et al., supra note 5 at 1793 (“[P]articipants in virtual worlds incur 
significant social and financial costs when they are forced to leave.  They not only have to leave behind a network of friends 
and their accumulation of social and other capital, but also are forced to abandon the persistent narrative that they have 
constructed . . . .”). 
87
 Per Prof. Fairfield, “The South Korean population is 48 million.  As of February 1, 2004, 30 million users had accessed the 
Lineage virtual environments.  Over two million users access Lineage regularly.  Over forty-one percent of South Korean 
teenagers spend significant amounts of time in virtual worlds.”  Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1087–88 (internal citations omitted). 
88
 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 14–15), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1304234_code718923.pdf?abstractid=1304234. 
89
 Id. (manuscript at 1–2). 
90
 Jeff W. LeBlanc, The Pursuit of Virtual Life, Liberty, and Happiness and its Economic and Legal Recognition in the Real 
World, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 255, 281–82 (2008). 
91
 Id.  Australia in particular is considering taxing virtual transactions.  China’s virtual property protection is “part of the 
Chinese government’s initiative to build a competitive virtual world industry.”  Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1085. 
92
 Supra Part II.B. 
93
 Supra note 35. 
94
 Supra Part I. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Lastowka et al., supra note 11 at 59 n.314. 
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ones en masse.97  Therefore, a virtual-world equivalent to real-world incarceration’s long-term separation of the 
convicted from society does not exist; the convict would quickly leave the virtual world.98 
The intent of developers is usually expressed as retaining “the ability to modify the world as they see fit, 
without being limited contractually.”99  Even if that is their intent, commentators dispute whether the EULAs that 
are drafted achieve this goal.100  Instead, these EULAs create chilling effects from uncertain rights and potential 
for lawsuits—all of which would be lowered by “drafting the terms fairly—or at least less lopsidedly[.]”101 
Developer’s drafting of EULAs has also been intended to preclude any property right in virtual property 
acquired or created by participants.  Because the EULA is up front, developers may allege, participants are on 
notice.  They should not become too attached to their characters and possessions because ultimate control rests 
with the developer.  This argument disregards theories through which participants should (and absent a possibly 
unconscionable contract provision, would) have a property interest in their virtual property.102  It also undermines 
the premise of virtual worlds—developers make these worlds to inspire participants to invest time and energy in 
their character, with the expectation that the developer won’t seize their property. 
Another intent expressed by developers is to prevent real money trade, “the sale of in-game items, 
currency, characters or other data in order to obtain real money.”103  Certain developers have embraced this 
activity, while others have forbidden it.104  Many of the developers who embrace it do so because the revenue from 
selling virtual property is becoming substantial; Second Life and Everquest II have real money trade operations 
owned and sanctioned by the developer, possibly to derive commissions and yet another income source.105  Market 
interest in real money trade is forecasted to increase.106 
If the participants’ virtual property rights are recognized, however, developers that forbid real money trade 
may find courts willing to hold that forbiddance unconscionable.  But for the EULA provision forbidding real 
money trade,107 World of Warcraft’s over 11.5 million subscribers108 would be able to trade and sell their virtual 
property interests in their character and inventory.  It shocks the conscience to see a contract of adhesion put this 
severe a restraint on such a valuable property interest.109 
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 Id; Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 415, 418 (2008) (“[P]roviders want 
to take little or no responsibility for interactions between their users so long as users do not leave in droves.”). 
98
 Contra Stoup, supra note 7 at 330 (“The cornfield purgatory sanction entailed banishing a resident who violated one of the 
rules of Second Life to [an area] where all the resident could do was ride a tractor in a field of corn.”  To their chagrin, “[t]his 
sanction was ultimately an ineffective deterrent because many residents wanted to see the cornfield purgatory and started to 
purposefully violate Second Life’s rules to experience the tractor ride.”) 
99
 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 19. 
100
 Id. (among the reasons: the EULAs are already so in the favor of the developer, it’s hard to see how they are limited; also 
the lack of notice militates against enforceability.) 
101
 Id. at ¶ 22. 
102
 See Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part II; Westbrook, supra note 17 at 801. 
103
 Square-Enix, Questions & Answers, Real Money Trading.  
https://secure.playonline.com/polapps/s/s.kb.html.Qa?ZUID=3&polg_loc=en&id=2802. 
104
 World of Warcraft’s Blizzard Entertainment has “banned over 59,000 accounts and removed 22,000,000 gold from the 
virtual economy” due to real market trade.  Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Introduction.  Final Fantasy XI’s Square-Enix has a 
“Special Task Force . . . dedicated to stopping the use of both third-party programs and RMT-related activities.”  Id.  By 
contrast, “Linden Lab encourages [real money trade] activity” in Second Life; EverQuest banned and EverQuest II permitted it; 
and Ultima Online embraced real money trade.  Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part III. 
105
 Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part III. 
106
 Id. 
107
 World of Warcraft Terms of Use § 11, available at http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (agreeing to “no 
right or title in or to . . . virtual goods or currency appearing or originating in the Game[.] . . . Blizzard does not recognize . . . 
the purported sale, gift or trade in the "real world" of anything that appears or originates in the Game.”). 
108
 Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base Reaches 11.5 Million Worldwide (December 23, 
2008), available at http://www.blizzard.com/us/press/081121.html. 
109
 See Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part III; contra Jamie J. Kayser, Note, The New New-World: Virtual Property and the End 
User License Agreement, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 59, 78 (2006) (“[A]t the level of basic contractual analysis, the clear intent 
of the parties is manifested and easily discernable by the court. . . . Players have agreed not to buy or sell virtual objects outside 
of the virtual world of [World of Warcraft].”  Therefore, courts should “defer to the express terms of the agreement and give 
Blizzard total control over the virtual world . . . .”) 
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2.4 Spy vs. Spy110 Online—Virtual-World Participants’ Attempts to Outwit Developers’ EULA and 
Programmatic Constraints 
 
In virtual worlds where the EULA forbids real money trading, a black market still engages in real money 
trading.111  Businesses operate around the lucrative premise of generating virtual property to offer for real money 
trade.  The market was in 2007 worth approximately one billion dollars.  This has several negative effects on 
participants’ experience: the inability to prevent this black market arouses participants’ resentment of the black-
market merchants’ EULA violations,112 and the risk of fraud rises. 
Entire participant accounts are also traded and sold, again generally in violation of EULAs.  This is done to 
be able to have characters, who can participate in groups with other friends who have invested a lot of time into 
their characters and also to impress others with all of their seemingly hard-earned virtual possessions.113  
Developers’ police listings on popular auction sites such as eBay and successfully prevent some sellers.114  The 
same black market’s negative effects above apply to these transactions. 
Lowering these negative effects is one reason for developer-sanctioned and -operated real money trade 
operations, as discussed in II.C.  Doing so allows developer control over the market—they can “ensure 
performance on all contracts, thus eliminating fraud and thereby generating heightened customer satisfaction.”115  
Real money trading regulation, as opposed to prohibition, is an increasing trend in virtual world governance—
EverQuest II’s allowance was a reversal for a major virtual-world developer in this area. 
Aside from virtual property restraints, virtual-world law also involves other areas of real-world law.  
Consider torts: having millions of people interacting in these virtual worlds will necessarily create some virtual 
libels, batteries, and intentional inflictions of emotional distress.  The feeling of anonymity granted by the internet, 
enhanced by a participant’s character being a literal “troll,”116 leads to behavioral extremes in virtual worlds.  
During a news interview within the virtual world, animated phalluses attacked a real-estate mogul in Second Life 
with real-world portraits of the mogul’s player holding a giant phallus.117  Virtual world developers as a social 
experiment created a trader in A Tale in the Desert who “caused an uproar when he ‘declared he would not sell to 
women and then inquired whether one female character was for sale.’ ”118 
These, too, are often forbidden by EULAs.119  But such provisions are impossible to enforce adequately, 
and usually sanctions for such activity are not severe.  Participants, who engage in such activity, often create false 
pretenses to explain why they did so when asked by the developer’s employees, under II.B’s abuse reports—they 
claim to be role-playing or that they were provoked.  Generally, the true purpose is for comedic value or ‘lulz,’ 
“the joy of disrupting another’s emotional equilibrium.  ‘Lulz is watching someone lose their mind at their 
computer 2,000 miles away while you chat with friends and laugh,’ said one ex-troll . . . .”120 
To summarize, EULAs taken alone present a flawed method of governance of virtual worlds.  First, they 
are rooted in contracts that are susceptible to unconscionability and courts are finding it.  Second, participants are 
not the intended beneficiaries of this source of virtual world law indicated by their lack of recourse under the 
EULA, which undermines their participatory experience.  Third, the developers’ intent is not to provide a judicial 
system, only to keep subscribers complacent and paying.  Finally, participants have the motivation and capability 
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 “Spy vs. Spy is a wordless black and white comic strip that has been published in Mad magazine since 1961. . . . The comic 
features two spies, Black and White, who are constantly warring against each other, and coming up with increasingly 
sophisticated ways of doing away with the other.”  Wikipedia, Spy vs. Spy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spy_vs._spy. 
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 See Kane, supra note 80 at 558-59; LeBlanc, supra note 89 at 272-73. 
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 See Kane, supra note 80 at 559 (discussing class-action plaintiffs at a disadvantage for not buying virtual gold on World of 
Warcraft in Hernandez v. IGE U.S., LLC, Case No. 07-21403-Civ-Cohn/Seltzer.  (D.Fla. August 26, 2008)  This case has since 
settled but the class-action may be resumed (see Joint Stipulation at ¶ 1, available at 
http://virtuallyblind.com/files/hernandez/hernandez_stipulation.pdf).). 
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 See Kayser, supra note 108 at 74. 
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 See id. at 66; Kane, supra note 80 at 558; Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1063; Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Introduction; see also 
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http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/races/trolls.shtml.  In internet culture, troll also has a figurative sense that is fitting here: 
“someone who intentionally disrupts online communities.”  Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence, N.Y. TIMES, August 3, 2008, 
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 Assalone, supra note 83 at 179–80. 
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 Rogers, supra note 79 at 413 (quoting Daniel Terdiman, Heavy Price for Free Speech, WIRED, Nov. 2, 2004, available at 
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to circumvent EULA provisions.  Because of these failings, external regulation is necessary as a second tier of 
rulemaking. 
 
3. Current External Regulatory Attempts Fail to Properly Regulate, Requiring 
EULAs 
 
Even at its best, external regulation will not protect every instance of behaviors not protected by EULAs in virtual 
worlds.  There are problems, including jurisdiction of participants of virtual worlds, which are common to the 
internet itself.121  Traditional notions of jurisdiction greatly increase the difficulty of litigants bringing real-world 
actions based on virtual-world acts; many of their potential defendants are in distant or extra-national 
jurisdictions.122  Federal statutes to regulate this would provide intra-national consistency, but would be helpless in 
cases from outside the nation. 
Because of this, Professor Joshua A.T. Fairfield argues for a common-law-codified-to-statute approach for 
the internet: “Rules for regulation of the Internet have developed according to the same process as the common 
law elsewhere: business norms have developed into industry standards, which in turn are adopted by courts, and 
the resulting common law rules are codified by statutes.”123  The solution proposed in Part 4 formalizes the 
business norms and industry standards portion of this method for the virtual world industry, giving courts ready 
access to standards to consider; this Part considers alternative routes to regulation. 
 
3.1 “The Blind Are Not Good Trailblazers”124 
 
Because of the differences between EULAs, courts and legislators will have great difficulty deciding virtual world 
issues without any guidance.  Essentially, each virtual world has its own legal system, coined as ‘EULAw’ by one 
commentator.125  “Federal legislation in the new arena of virtual worlds also runs the risk of outstripping 
congressional understanding of the issues and technology of virtual worlds, as it has in other areas of 
technology.”126  Some virtual worlds even have a notion of caselaw.127  These complicate any one-size-fits-all 
solution devised by regulators.  Per Judge Easterbrook, “If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-
understood technology such as photocopiers . . . what chance do we have for a technology such as computers that 
is mutating faster than the virus in The Andromeda Strain?”128 
Mapping current regulatory methods into virtual worlds also has significant problems, albeit different from 
EULAs.  Unlike real property, virtual property is susceptible to bugs in the virtual world that can reduce its utility 
and value.129  The development process also leads to newly created virtual properties unbalancing the existing 
virtual world, and subsequent re-balancing efforts to correct that.  The developer also retains an interest—a 
possessory interest at the code level—of virtual property.130  Other regulatory schemes have had similar 
difficulties when applied to virtual worlds.131 
Commentators question whether external regulation is required at all.  Because current property doctrines 
do not fit virtual worlds, Dan Lawrence argues that “new property law doctrines to protect virtual property” would 
be required.132  Even if needed, only a “narrow range of circumstances entitl[e] a virtual property holder to a legal 
remedy.”  Lawrence determines that current contractual arrangements and courts’ declaring certain provisions 
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Cracks in the Foundation: The New Internet Legislation’s Hidden Threat to Privacy and Commerce, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1193, 
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123
 Id. at 1199. 
124
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Property, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 521–23 (2008). 
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unconscionable is sufficient for virtual property, and the attention afforded virtual worlds “does not per se 
demonstrate the need for new laws.”  If existing laws work, use them.133 
 This argument is flawed for virtual worlds when applied outside of property, including property-based 
torts and torts against the person.  These differ from Mr. Lawrence’s example of real-world tortious acts that are 
allowed and accepted within the virtual world, such as the ability for your character to steal property in Ultima 
Online134; these are acts arising from or related to conduct in the virtual world that is a real-world tort directed at 
the participant, not their character in the virtual world.  These are generally forbidden by EULAs,135 but are not 
enforced in the same manner as a court would.  Examples above show that the developer’s business model 
provides financial reward for the developer to lack interest in providing the same remedies that a court could 
provide to participant-to-participant interactions.136 
These failures to provide remedies have contributed to real-world murder and other crimes from frustrated 
participants.  Chengwei’s sword was not protected under China’s property laws at the time, resulting in grave 
consequences.137  Currently in the United States, it would also not be protected.  Applying real-world regulation 
and modifying it as needed to specifically address torts arising from virtual worlds is justified—existing laws do 
not work.  Existing laws’ and EULAs’ failures make participants desperate. 
The argument also fails to protect virtual property transactions that are outside the terms of the EULA, 
which is an agreement between just a participant and the developer, not between participants.  Participants who 
would have a colorable legal claim against another participant need to apply the third-party beneficiary doctrine.  
“To date, . . . the practical and theoretical boundaries of . . . application to virtual worlds have yet to be fully 
explored, perhaps because of an overly narrow doctrinal conception.”138  Even if found to apply, “[t]he question 
becomes which terms are actionable by one member against another and which terms are not.”139 
It is likely that this doctrine will change as a result of virtual worlds—another indicator that current contract 
law is not sufficient.  Existing property law did not anticipate these kinds of contractual wrinkles coming into play.  
Therefore, regulation must change or new regulation be introduced to support virtual world participation, 
involving more than just virtual property. 
 
3.2 Regulation Will Likely Split the Virtual World’s Community, Frustrating Regulatory Attempts 
 
Prior regulatory attempts at Internet applications have worked like a cudgel, splintering the communities they were 
intended to regulate.  Consider the attempted regulation of Napster, which changed centralized file sharing to 
decentralized file sharing.140  The ability of users to emulate servers of virtual worlds and avoid the centralized 
server provided by the developer indicates the same future is possible here.  It would result in virtual world 
“providers themselves disappear[ing], and with them almost any hope on the part of real-world lawmakers to 
directly influence the governance inside virtual worlds.”141  Currently, developers have been active in policing the 
attempts of others to emulate the developer’s virtual world server; such behavior is generally against their 
EULAs.142  If worlds become decentralized, there would be less developer presence. 
As an additional result, the current regulatory scheme of EULAs would be completely lost.  Having no 
developer control over the world creates a vacuum of enforcement, and players in these decentralized virtual 
worlds would have no recourse.  As with LambdaMOO, “[w]hen the [developers] abdicated authority over social 
conflicts, one character named Mr. Bungle took advantage of the vacuum of rule enforcement to pursue actions 
online for which he knew he would face no real-world consequences: he engaged in the verbal sexual assault of 
other avatars.”143  Regulatory efforts may in fact therefore make the current oppressive EULA regime break and 
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anarchy ensue.  If developers are “benevolent dictators,” these efforts could be analogous to toppling that 
dictatorship and failing to rebuild a government. 
 
 
4. A Coordinated Effort to Provide Regulatory Guidance Across Virtual Worlds 
may Provide a Basis for External Regulation, or Make External Regulation 
Unnecessary 
 
Self-regulation of other internet protocols and applications already exist.  The World Wide Web Consortium is an 
international standards organization founded in 1994.  Tim Berners-Lee founded it “[t]o lead the World Wide Web 
to its full potential by developing protocols and guidelines that ensure long-term growth for the Web.”144  The 
Consortium has been responsible for standardizing graphical formats, Cascading Style Sheets, Hypertext Markup 
Language revisions, and Extensible Markup Language.145  Although these have not been adopted and enforced by 
governmental regulators, those that would be regulated—web browser application developers, web developers, 
and others—employ the Consortium’s standards.  Therefore, it is effective self-regulation.  Other mechanisms for 
self-regulation come from the Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers.146  The former develops “standards that allow the Internet to function as a global network[;]” the 
latter administers the domain name system.147 
Mr. Caral summarizes arguments for self-regulation.  Adapted to this topic: first, self-regulating developers 
know their industry and technical limitations; second, developers’ accessible “in-house” expertise lowers the costs 
of regulation; third, the virtual-world developers being regulated know the developers who are regulating them and 
trust them more than outside regulators; fourth, developer self-regulation may be less formal and save costs; and 
fifth, the costs are allocated to the virtual world industry not the public.148  Furthermore, self-regulation is 
encouraged by the government: “Even where collective action is necessary, governments should encourage 
industry self-regulation and private-sector leadership where possible . . .”149 
The likely reason that the government is so willing to promote self-regulation for the Internet is because the 
government is only just getting acquainted with how to regulate it.  The virtual world council can be the 
government’s role model.150  Better yet, if the council’s self-regulation is effective, the government is willing to 
stay out entirely: “Where government intervention is necessary, its role should be to ensure competition, . . . and 
facilitate dispute resolution, not to regulate.”151 
Here, the virtual world market is such that self-regulation is feasible.  Developers of virtual worlds are few, 
because of large barriers to entry.152  Many projects in development never come to fruition due to these barriers.  
“The market of virtual world providers operates with the conscious parallelism of an oligopoly, instead of a truly 
competitive market.  As a result, consumers often do not have meaningful choice when selecting between EULAs 
of virtual realms.”153 
Developers should self-regulate because keeping governmental regulatory schemes out of their industry 
retains their ability to change the world as they fit.154  At the least, developers could constrain oversight to the 
standards that the virtual world council sets.  Alternatively, instead of mere contractual obligations in EULAs, 
developers would also have to contend with regulatory obligations from external entities.  If developers of virtual 
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worlds prove capable to protect participants’ rights and ensure competition between worlds,155 such oversight may 
not be necessary. 
Proper protection of participants’ rights will require developers to invite participants to the bargaining table 
for their EULAs.  Although this has not been done in virtual worlds, social networking sites on the internet such as 
Facebook have done so.156  Persuading individual developers to collaborate with their users proves difficult.  
Developers hang their hat on the notion that it their virtual world is just a game and that it is just our game; if 
participants don’t like that, they can leave.  And right now, the market is sufficiently small and oligopolistic that 
this developer attitude works because participants lack a meaningful choice.  As virtual worlds expand, however—
and Professor Edward Castronova predicted 100 million participants by 2030157—the industry will need to change.  
EULA provisions will become a competitive advantage for virtual world developers to leverage, just as Second 
Life leveraged their intellectual property protection. 
A standards-setting body of developers such as a virtual world council provides an impetus for change.  
This would pressure existing virtual-world developers to become compliant or lose participant trust.158  
Furthermore, a standard does not stifle competition.  Instead, granting incentives that indicate to participants, for 
example, that this virtual world is compliant with the virtual world council’s virtual property standards that protect 
your investment of time and energy promotes competition.  It incentivizes developers that modify their EULA to 
support these rights and become compliant.  Compliance with the virtual world council’s possible virtual 
harassment standards also supports competition, by making participants feel that this virtual world is a safer place 
to develop their character than a different, non-compliant world. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The creation of standards-setting bodies that consist of developers of virtual worlds may provide a solution that 
avoids external regulation.  If the alternative to providing rights in EULAs to participants is the government 
wading into the fray, developers may be pressured to protect their participants.  When the government enters this 
arena, Napster-like results can occur to the industry, which could destroy the developer’s oligopoly. 
Additionally, once standards exist, participants and courts have an easier way to view the virtual world than 
through the byzantine provisions of the EULA.  Standards provide a basis for objective comparison of potential 
virtual worlds to participate in, and a basis for the development of common law methods of adjudicating virtual 
world disputes.159  The transaction costs to both participants and courts in interpreting virtual worlds are reduced 
by standardization. 
Finally, developers are the most efficient party to task with the creation of such a council and the creation 
of standards.  They have far and away the most knowledge of how this industry works.  They also have the 
leverage and credibility to persuade developers to compete with each other to attain compliance with the published 
standards.  Lastly, the developers themselves are profiting from the virtual worlds; as for the standards for virtual 
worlds, they should be bearing the cost of creating them and being bound by them. 
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